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STATE LAW IN THE FEDERAL COURTS:
THE BROODING OMNIPRESENCE OF
ERIE v. TOMPKINS*
CHARLES E. CLARI(" .
1,,y first acquaintance with Justice Cardozo was on an historic
occasion, that when in 1921 "The Nature of the Judicial Process' was
given to the world of jurisprudence through the medium of the Storrs
Lectures at Yale University." Being then a mere neophyte on the law,
faculty, permitted perhaps to be seen and not heard, I had joined
somewhat perfunctorily in the faculty judgment that here there was
not merely a good judge, but even more a student and scholar in the
law worthy of our highest platform honor. The thought apparently
was that the Justice would take his place among the galaxy of notables,
eminent, respectable, and portentous, who had held the lectureship in
the past. But I doubt that any of us vas prepared to be so wooed and
won as we were by the gentle, shy, and engaging personality who
charmed his listeners to the point of achieving the supreme distinction
of requiring a larger hall for his huge audience. That was contrary to
all tradition. For attendance at a lecture series was expected to dwindle
to only the dean and one or more nominated members of the faculty.
In all my academic experience I can recall hardly another case where
even a popular lecturer more than held his own over a number of days;
perhaps the only competitor has been the irrepressible and ebullient
President Hutchins, whose iconoclastic views of education 2 afforded a
spicy contrast with the calm and impartial ideal judge as pictured in
"The Nature of the Judicial Process."
After that first academic success Justice Cardozo returned to com-
plete his picture of the jurist in action, in the lectures he has called
"The Growth of the Law" ;3 and several times thereafter he spoke from
tUnited States Circuit Judge, Second Circuit Court of Appeals.
*The following is the fifth annual Benjamin N. Cardozo Lecture, which was delivered
on December 4, 1945, under the auspices of the Committee on Post-Admi~sion Legal Edu-
cation, of the Association of the Bar of the City of New York. A report of the Addrez- ako
appears in N. Y. L. J., Dec. 5, 1945, p. 1575, col. 1.
1. Published by Yale U. Press, 1921.
2. HuTcHINs, THE HIGHER LEARNING IN Ai RcIc, (Storrs Lectures, 1936) published
by Yale U. Press, 1936.
3. Lectures given at the Law School of Yale University, December, 1923; published
by Yale U. Press, 1924.
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academic and other platforms 4 until membership in our highest court
unfortunately limited his activities as our premier judicial essayist.
But I think he always retained a peculiar affection for my colleagues
and me, because we were the first as a faculty to recognize his juristic
worth and to render him academic obeisance and honor. At any rate
there followed for me, as for all of us at Yale, a delightful personal
friendship which lasted until his death. Only recently I picked up
again some correspondence of twenty years ago wherein he repulsed
with gentle firmness some criticism I had made of one of his decisions,
causing me to publish some "friendly criticism 'from a person familiar
with" the case, as he asked to have himself described.' I wish I could
stop to recall the many tokens of friendship and inspiration owed him,
but I must turn without delay to the garland of intellectual flowers
which this lectureship so fittingly requires as our yearly tribute to him.
It is not without some trepidation that I approach my present task.
The Justice's own standard of literary effort was so high as to make
our lesser attempts seem feeble indeed. Moreover, the standard of the
four memorial lectures already given will be hard for those of us who
come after to maintain. Indeed, the level was set on an upper plateau
by the very first one, where our dear friend Chief Judge Lehman paid
his superb tribute to his intimate associate of so many years.' How
alike were these two great men, not only in superb qualification for
the judicial task, but in human sympathy and understanding as well !
When I planned this essay I felt that I could look forward to at least
one warm and friendly listener whose sympathetic interest would
carry me over all rough spots. And now he, too, is gone and his place
cannot be filled. May it not be hoped that these yearly memorial
addresses may stand somewhat at least as a reminder and remem-
brance also of our dear friend so recently gone who stood so close in
life to the kindred spirit in whose name the lectures are given !
But it is not so much the possibility of unequal contest with others
to this platform accustomed and respected that gives me pause. After
all, each of us must fashion his own form of intellectual tribute with
such capabilities as he has; and it is idle to worry over its fitness to
stand comparison with those of others. My trepidation comes from the
task I have set myself-to suggest problems and raise doubts, rather
4. See LAW AND LITERATURE AND OTHER ESSAYS AND ADDRESSES (1931); THE PARA-
DOxES OF LEGAL SCIENCE (1928). Compare Shientag, The Opinions and Writings of Judge
Benjamin N. Cardozo (1930) 30 COL. L. REv. 597; Shientag, The Seventy-Fifth Anniversary
of the Birth of Justice Benjamin N. Cardozo, reprinted from N. Y. L. J., May 24,1945, p. 1978,
cols. 1-3; and the memorial essays cited infra note 12.
5. (1924) 37 HARv. L. REv. 760; CLARK, REAL COVENANTS (1929) 146, 147.
6. LEHMAN, THE INFLUENCE OF JUDGE CARDOZO ON THE COMMON LAW (1941), also
reprinted (1942) 35 L. LIB. J. 2. Other lectures are FULLER, REASON AND FIAT IN CASE
LAW (1942); SHIENTAG, THE PERSONALITY OF THE JUDGE (1943); JACKSON, FULL FAIT1
AND CREDIT, THE LAWYER'S*CLAUSE OF THE CONSTITUTION (1944), (1945) 45 COL. L. RmV. 1.
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than to resolve confusion; to disturb thought, rather than to dispense
legal or moral truth. I make no apology for my subject itself. Daily
in the federal courts we are assailed by the problems of how to recon-
cile state and national juridical viewpoints. And every discussion of
that matter must now begin and end with at least some reference to a
single great case. My senior colleague Judge Learned Hand has a way
of startling counsel in these "erieantompkinated" days by saying, as
they approach that inevitable citation: "I don't suppose a civil appeal
can now be argued to us without counsel sooner or later quoting large
portions of Erie Railroad v. Tompkins."
That famous opinion, rendered in 1938, is already one of the most
discussed cases in the Court's history, though it is strictly a lawyer's
law case, unknown to the general public. In it, Justice Brandeis, in
overruling Story's century-old decision in Swift v. Tyson, says that the
books show nearly a thbusand citations on the troublesome point of
general versus local law in the federal courts which the earlier case
had attempted to settle.7 But in the few short years since he spoke, an
equal number of citations and of precedents have already spread out
from the base he furnished; and the flood is clearly not diminishing.8
And those sensitive barometers of legal thought, the law reviews,
show by their diligent and continuous attention to this case that it
has suggested at least as many questions as it has answered.0 More-
over, the problem touches two ever fascinating vistas of American
thought-one, the nature of our federal system and the difficulties of
adjusting the spheres of authority of two independent, co-ordinate,
and largely competitive sovereignties operating in the same territory,
and the other, the one never more felicitously delimited than in Judge
Cardozo's phrase, "the nature of the judicial process," or how judges
can ever decide cases, particularly hard ones. Even our colleagues of
the state judiciary may well assume an interest in this subject, for it
is they who furnish--or gaily or maliciously or indifferently refuse to
furnish-the "brute raw data," which we are required to "process"
(to be technical about it) into the phenomenon of a "federal decision"
without making a single change.
Hence it is not the subject itself, but its development in formal
7. 304 U. S. 64, 74 (1938), referring to the Federal Digest.
8. This estimate is based upon Shepard's United States Citations, which points to an
increase of citations in the more recent volumes of the Federal Reporter. See al-o 22 FED.
DIG. § 359 et seq.; cf. Zlinkoff, Erie v. Tompkins: In Relation to the Law of Trade-M2arks and
Unfair Competition (1942) 42 COL. L. REY. 955.
9. To these acute and stimulating articles I am deeply grateful for whatever thought
I may have developed about the subject beyond the mere day-to-day worries of an "in-
ferior" federal judge. Many, though not all, of those consulted are cited hereinafter to
special points; for some bibliographies, see 1 NMooma, FEDERAL PRAcricE (1944 Cum.
Supp.) 228; Zlinkoff, supra note 8; DoBIE . D LADD, CASES ON FEDERAL JURISDICTION AND
PROCEDURE (1940) 556, 557, 573; and the Tompkins opinion as citeditnfra notes 10,11.
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lecture, which requires some fortitude. What more can be added to a
topic already so thoroughly canvassed? Indeed, what can be said more
than has been said by Story and Bradley and Brewer for the older
view,'0 and by Holmes and Field and Brandeis for the one now in
ascendency? 11 One recalls Judge Cardozo's classic analysis of the six
types of judicial opinions; surely we must classify these great decisions
as of "the type magisterial or imperative," leaving further discussion
to be only of "the type tonsorial or agglutinative, so called from the
shears and the pastepot which are its implements and emblem." 12
But notwithstanding all this, my day-to-day work tells me that the
last word has not been spoken, that perhaps it never will be so long
as we have the states as independent competing sovereignties within
the national framework, and that the judicial task becomes not only
more difficult, but more dubious and unsatisfactory, as we try to at-
tribute finality to a single arbitrary principle. I feel I should warn you
at once of my rather unoriginal, but strongly held thesis that notwith-
standing the present marked shift towards emphasis of state law in the
federal courts, yet there is, even as yet, no rule of thumb to tell the
federal judge what to do in many a particular case; that reliance on
such an assumed rule leads only to confusion and more confusion; and
that in ultimate analysis only the hardest and best mental effort, hard
case by hard case, making use of all of the capacities stressed by Justice
Cardozo or Justice Shientag 11 and all of the materials allowed us by
the Supreme Court, and the professors as well, 4 can yield even a mod-
10. Compare Bradley, J., in Burgess v. Seligman, 107 U. S. 20 (1883), and Brewer, J.,
in Baltimore & 0. R. Co. v. Baugh, 149 U. S. 368 (1893); also Butler, J., dissenting in
Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U. S. 64, 80 (1938), and Johnson, J., in the cases cited infra
note 39. Law review articles supporting this view are cited 304 U.S. at 77.
11. Compare the famous dissents by Holmes, J., in Kuhn v. Fairmont Coal Co., 215
U. S. 349, 370 (1910), and Black & White Taxicab & Transfer Co. v. Brown & Yellow Taxi-
cab &Transfer Co., 276 U. S. 518, 532, 533 (1928); and Field, J., in Baltimore & 0. R. Co. v.
Baugh, 149 U. S. 368, 390 (1893), as well as the opinion of Brandeis, J., in Erie R. Co. v.
Tompkins, 304 U. S. 64 (1938). The critical law review articls which had quite decisive
influence, particularly Warren, New Light on the History of the Federal Judiciary Act of 1789
(1923) 37 HARv. L. REv. 49, are cited in Justice Brandeis' opinion.
12. CARDOZO, LAW AND LITERATURE AND OTHER ESSAYS AND ADDRESSES (1931) 10
(reprinted from (1925) 14 YALE REVIEW 699; also in the Essays Dedicated to fr. Justice
Cardozo, (1939) 35 COL. L. REv. 1, 52 HARv. L. REv. 353, 48 YALE L. J. 371) quoted in
Shientag, The Style of Judicial Opinions, N. Y. L. J., May 26,1944, p. 2036, col. 1.
13. CARDozo, op. cit. supra note 1; SHIENTAG, op. cit. supra note 6.
14. See particularly Professor Corbin's plea in The Laws of the Several States (1941)
50 YALE L. J. 762, 771, for a wider content to "other persuasive data" (beyond mere state
decisions) than is explicitly stated in Mr. Justice Stone's statement of sources in West v.
American Tel. & Tel. Co., 311 U. S. 223 (1940). See also Corbin, The Common Law of the
United States (1938) 47 YALE L. J. 1351; Goodrich, Mr. Tompkins Restates the Law (1941)
27 A. B. A. J. 547; Stimson, Swift v. Tyson-What Remains? What Is (State) Law? (1938)
24 CoRN. L. Q. 54; Broh-Kahn, Uniformity Run Riot-Extensions of the Eric Case (1943)
31 Ky. L. J. 99; Zlinkoff, supra note 8, at 966-969.
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erately satisfactory answer. In a slightly different connection Justice
Shientag has said that "the problem in opinion writing is what may be
termed 'architectonic' in character-to find the right scale and pro-
portion." 15 That I suggest as an apt description of our task.
Now in developing the right scale and proportion in our immediate
context, we must at once accord great weight to the undoubted benefit,
the general satisfaction, in the increased authority given state law
upon issues of local significance. The anomaly of having two courts
across the street (or as the Supreme Court now prefers to say, "a block
away" 16) dispensing justice in similar cases, but in different ways and
according to different principles, is abhorrent. Perhaps we shall finally
conclude that the gain in its abolition outweighs all losses or all
doubts or confusions which the new rule has brought in its train. Cer-
tainly we shall be disposed that way if we remain of the opinion that
no other course less drastic would have achieved these benefits. But
against this we must place some very definite losses, both in the char-
acter of confusion which does, and perhaps of necessity must, result
and in the lessened judicial skill and effectiveness which has been, so
far at least, a required concomitant of the rule. And since in the time
available to me I cannot hope to cover all aspects of this e.xtensive
topic, I propose to devote my attention to certain type situations
which seem to me particularly to illustrate the point I am suggesting.
Hence after a brief statement of both the To~mpkins and Swift cases
against their respective backgrounds, with some remarks on the vexed
question of unconstitutionality of the earlier doctrine, I shall discuss
first, the appropriate areas of federal and state law and the impact
of the federal specialties, such as bankruptcy, copyrights, and patents;
second, the choice to be made when not one, but several states have
law at hand for federal use; third, the choice between federal "merest
procedure and state substance; and fourth, the discovery of state law
when it is nonexistent, nonconsistent, or nonsensical. And first let us
meet Messrs. Tompkins and Swift.
ToipmNs VERSUS SWIFT
Tompkins, injured in Pennsylvania by a railroad freight train while
he was walking on a path beside the tracks, brought suit in the District
Court of the United States for the Southern District of New York and
recovered a verdict of $30,000 against the railroad. The latter appealed
on the ground that under Pennsylvania law Tompkins could not claim
the status of licensee, but was only a trespasser, since he was on a
path which ran along, but not across, the tracks. The Circuit Court of
Appeals affirmed, however, on principles of general law without exami-
15. Shientag, op. cit. supra note 12.
16. Compare both Justices Frankfurter and Rutledge in Guaranty Trust Co. v. York,
326 U. S. 99, 109, 112,119 (1945).
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nation of the Pennsylvania cases."7 Because of this method of decision
the Supreme Court reversed and remanded the case to the appellate
court for a determination of the local law which it held to be control-
ling. On remand, the appellate court obeyed the Supreme Court's
mandate and determined Pennsylvania law with the result that it held
Tompkins was not entitled to his verdict. Accordingly, it ordered the
action dismissed, and the Supreme Court then declined further re-
view.'8 For Tompkins at least the change in doctrine meant a loss of
$30,000.
Now, even though there were weighty precedents for the course
originally followed in the lower courts, I doubt if many of us would
have paused long to object to a decision that rights and remedies
flowing out of a personal injury sustained in Pennsylvania must be
determined by Pennsylvania law. And I expect we would readily agree
that the ground for the older view-the national character of an inter-
state railroad 19-was hardly enough to justify treatment of a non-
citizen so differently than Pennsylvania citizens would be treated in
the local courts.20 But other factors lent drama to the occasion. There
was first the overruling of Story's long entrenched decision, or "doc-
trine," and the hundreds of cases relying upon and enforcing it.21 There
was the determination that the famous Rules of Decision section of the
Federal Judiciary Act of 1789 did include court decisions in its refer-
ence to the controlling force federal-wise of "the laws of the several
States." 22 There was the further fact, animadverted upon at length
17. Tompklns v. Erie R. Co., 90 F. (2d) 603 (C. C. A. 2d, 1937), rev'd Erie R. Co. v.
Tompkins, 304 U. S. 64 (1938).
18. Tompkins v. Erie R. Co., 98 F. (2d) 49 (C. C. A. 2d, 1938), cert. denied 305 U. S.
637 (1938), rehearing denied 305 U. S. 673 (1938).
19. Baltimore & 0. R. Co. v. Baugh, 149 U.S. 368 (1893); Cole v. Pennsylvania R. Co.,
43 F. (2d) 953 (C. C. A. 2d, 1930), where Judge Augustus N. Hand followed the doctrine
with obvious reluctance because of the cases he there cited.
20. As Professor Cook has acutely observed, the Court nowhere adverts to the possible
question of choice of law which may be involved, or whether it is the New York view, if any,
of the Pennsylvania law which should govern. CooK, THE LOGICAL AND LEGAL BASES OF
THE CONFLICT OF LAWS (1942) c. 5, 109, 122, a reprint of his essay, The Federal Courts and
th Conflict of Laws (1942) 36 ILL. L. REV. 493; F. H. McGraw & Co. v. Milcor Steel Co.,
149 F. (2d) 301, 305 (C. C. A. 2d, 1945), cert. denied 66 Sup. Ct. 92 (U. S. 1945).
21. Probably there is no significance in the continued references throughout the opinion
to disapproval of the "doctrine of Swift v. Tyson," rather than the simple statement that
the case is "overruled," as the headnote has it, 304 U. S. 64. More important is it to note
that it is this doctrine, rather than a statute or even a case, which constitutes "an uncon-
stitutional assumption of powers by courts of the United States," and that "in disapproving
that doctrine we do not hold unconstitutional § 34 of the Federal Judiciary Act of 1789 or
any other Act of Congress. We merely declare that in applying the doctrine this Court and
the lower courts have invaded rights which in our opinion are reserved by the Constitution
to the several States." 304 U. S. at 79, 80.
22. Sec. 34 of the Judiciary Act of 1789, 1 STAT. 92 (1789), 28 U. S. C. § 725 (1940). The
several qualifications attached to the provision should be noted; thus, "The laws of the sev-
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in the dissent, that this occurred notwithstanding counsel's frank
statement, 'We do not question the finality of the holding of this
Court in Swift v. Tyson, 16 Pet. 1, that the 'laws of the several States'
referred to in the Rules of Decision Act do not include state court de-
cisions as such." 23 There is then the flat declaration, "There is no
federal general common law," 21 though the same justice the same day
in another case pointed out that there may be questions of "federal
common law" upon which state statutes and decisions cannot be con-
clusive, such as the apportionment betwveen two states of the water
of an interstate stream.25 And finally there is the statement that if
only a question of statutory construction were involved, this century-
old doctrine might be permitted to stand; but "the unconstitutionality
of the course pursued has now been made clear and compels" abandon-
ment of the doctrine. This oblique reference to unconstitutional judi-
cial conduct, without invalidation of any specific legislative act,
brought forth a concurring opinion from Justice Reed withholding
assent from that part of the decision; and it produced forceful calls
from the dissenting justices for reargument after statutory notice to
the Attorney General, as required by recent legislation when issues of
constitutionality of federal legislation arise. -  Among many trouble-
some features of the opinion this statement is perhaps the most trouble-
some; at least commentators have found it so. -
eral States, (1) except where the Constitution, treaties, or statutes of the United States
otherwise require or provide, shall be (2) regardcd as rules of decision (3) in trials at common
law, (4) in the courts of the United States, (5) in cases where they apply." (Numerals and
italics supplied.) This is obviously much more qualified than the outright command of the
Tompkins decision. It was the discovery by Mr. Varren in 1923, see supra note 11, at 8G, of
the original draft of the section by Ellsworth, showing that he had crossed out a longer phraze
clearly including both "the Statute law" of the several states and "their unrritten or
common law now in use," writing over it the word "laws," which has led to the concluion
that the wider meaning had alnays been intended. But, as the Tomphins dissent pointed
out, 304 U. S. at 86, this view had not persuaded the Court earlier, since Justice Holms,
dissenting in the Black & Mifte Taxicab case, 276 U. S. 51S (1928), had then cited the Warren
article. Moreover, there is still the problem, as commentators have shown, whether the
change in the draft supports the broader or the narrower interpretation. See particularly
comments by Shulman, Schweppe, and Teton, cited infra notes 27, 29.
23. Argument of counsel, 304 U. S. at 66.
24. 304 U. S. at 78. This was not a new idea; compare the statement of McLean, J.,
for Marshall, Story, and all the Court, in the famous case of Wheaton v. Peters, 8 Pet. 591,
657 (U. S. 1834), that "It is clear there can be no common law of the United Staten"; but,
diverging from Justice Brandeis' apparent view, "The common law could be made a part
of our federal system, only by legislative adoplion." (Italics added.)
25. Hinderlider v. La Plata River & Cherry Creek Ditch Co., 304 U.S. 92, 110 (1933).
See also Robinson v. Campbell, 3 Wheat. 212, 222, 223 (U. S. 1818); Jaclkon, J., concurring
in D'Oench, Duhme & Co., Inc. v. Federal Deposit Ins. Corp., 315 U. S. 447, 465, 469, 470
(1942).
26. See 304 U.S. at 77, 78, 87-9, 90; see also quotations in note 21 supra.
27. The statement seems to have been generally criticized in the law reviews, and
viewed as dictum, without basis in history or precedent; see, inter alia, Coos, Tas LoGICm..
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With the advantage of the hindsight now given us, let us turn to the
decision whose wide sway has so suddenly ended. It seems to have
become the custom not only to wonder at the strangeness of the Tyson
decision, but to find as its "chief" cause "the character and position of
Judge Story." In the view popularized by John Chipman Gray,
Story's position as "the oldest judge in commission on the bench," his
"great learning" and "reputation for learning greater even than the
learning itself," his occupation with writing a book on the subject of
the decision leading him "to dogmatize on the subject," his "great
success in extending the jurisdiction of the Admiralty," his fondness for
"glittering generalities," his possession "by a restless vanity"-all
conspired to produce the result.w This seems just a bit severe; it rather
justifies Professor Corbin's historical analogy, "After the Restoration,
Cromwell's poor remains were exhumed and dishonored." 29 Be that
as it may, the opinion itself is mild indeed, hardly demanding its as-
signment to "the type magisterial" to which I consigned it earlier. It
held only that on a Maine bill of exchange accepted in New York, an
assignment for a past consideration cut off the defense of fraud other-
wise open to the acceptor. And it stated it would reach this conclusion
as a matter of "general commercial law," even though the New York
decisions, being somewhat in confusion, might be considered to hold a
consideration already given insufficient for the purpose. The opinion
had the concurrence of all the other justices of the then reconstituted
or Jacksonian court."
It has been usual, also, to explain the decision as a consequence of a
way of judicial thinking of the time-one where, in Holmes's trenchant
phrases, there was "a transcendental body of law outside of any par-
ticular State but obligatory within it unless and until. changed by
statute," or "a brooding omnipresence in the sky" ;31 and the courts,
AND LEGAL BASES OF THE CONFLICT OF LAws (1942) 138-43; Broh-Kahn, Amendment by
Decision-More on the Eric Case (1941) 30 KY. L. J. 3; Tunks, Categorization and Federal.
ism: "Substance" and "Procedure" after Erie Railroad v. Tompkins (1939) 34 ILL. L. Ruv.
271, 293-5; McCormick and Hewins, The Collapse of "General" Law in the Federal Courts
(1938) 33 ILL. L. REv. 126, 134-6; Shulman, The Demise of Swift v. Tyson (1938) 47 YALn
L. J. 1336; Bowman, Unconstitutionality of the Rule of Swift v. Tyson (1938) 18 B. U. L.
REv. 659; Cowan, Constitutional Aspects of the Abolition of Federal "Comon Law" (1938)
1 LA. L. REv. 161; Schweppe, What Has Happened to Federal Jurisprudence? (1938) 24
A. B. A. J. 421; Herriott, Has Congress the Power to Modify the Effect of Eric Railroad Co. v.
Tompkins? (1941) 26 MARQ. L. REv. 1; Note (1938) 22 MINN. L. REV. 885.
28. GRAY, THE NATuRE AND SoURCEs OF THE LAW (2d Ed. 1921) 253, quoted in Shul-
man, supra note 27, at 1340; Jackson, The Rise and Fall of Swift v. Tyson (1938) 24 A. B. A. J.
609, 610.
29. Corbin, The Laws of the Several States (1941) 50 YALE L. J. 762, 763, n. 5. See also
extensive criticism in Teton, The Story of Swift v. Tyson (1941) 35 ILL. L. REv. 519, 526,
30. Catron, J., concurring, differed only on a point of interpretation of the general
law, viz., whether it applied in the case of assignment by way of pledge.
31. Holmes, J., dissenting in Kuhn v. Fairmont Coal Co., 215 U. S. 349, 370 (1910), in
Black & White Taxicab & Transfer Co. v. Brown & Yellow Taxicab & Transfer Co., 276
U. S. 518, 532 (1928), and in Southern Pac. Co. v. Jensen, 244 U. S. 205, 218, 222 (1917).
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even the federal courts, merely found and reported that law, but did
not create it.32 Now there has undoubtedly been much of that view in
our law generally; and Story does say, rather briefly in construing the
rules of decision section of the Judiciary Act, that "in the ordinary
use of language it will hardly be contended that the decisions of Courts
constitute laws," but are at most "only evidence of what the laws
are." 33 But I believe that that alone is not enough for the decision.
Just a few years earlier, in 1834, the Court, including Marshall as well
as Story, had joined in a statement that there could be "no common
law of the United States" and that "the common law could be made a
part of our federal system only by legislative adoption." 31 And a
little later when it came to a question of safeguarding municipal bond-
holders against loss under a change of state decision after acquisition
of the bonds, the Court had no difficulty in protecting the investors
against the new law under a somewhat different theory, which, how-
ever, was in practical effect only a logical extension of the Tyson doc-
trine of federal supremacy, as Mr. Justice Jackson has pointed out.35
Moreover, its acceptance as a decisive factor requires in ultimate
essence only the substitution of one premise for another. As Professor
Corbin has said, "Is there an omnipresence brooding over the state of
Pennsylvania?" 11 or, we may add, "only over Pennsylvania?" The
question really at issue is not whether there is not anywhere the brood-
ing omnipresence of the common law, but just where it shall be per-
mitted to operate; and I think my subtitle fairly expresses the substi-
tution we have made of one general abstraction for another.
True, we may get some support from the traditional conception of
our national government as one of limited and specifically granted
powers, though the picture of our operations in wartime, indeed of our
32. This analysis, adopted in the TompHkns decision, 304 U. S. at 79, is repuated in
striking phrase by Mr. Justice Frankfurter in Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U. S. 99, 101
(1945), where he says the Tomphiis decision did not "merely overrule a venerable cace,"
but "overruled a particular way of looking at law." Cf., however, Mr. Justice Rutledge dio-
senting, 326 U. S. at 112.
33. Swift v. Tyson, 16 Pet. 1, 13 (U.S. 1842).
34. Wheaton v. Peters, 8 Pet. 591, 657 (U. S. 1334), quoted supra note 24. Thompeon,
J., dissenting, would have affirmed the grant of relief to the former court reporter Wheaton
"whether as a [Pennsylvania] common law right or depending on the act of congre-z." 8 Pet.
at 698. See, generally, Von Aloschzisker, Tle Common Law and Our Fcdcral JurisprVdence
(1925) 74 U. of PA. L. Rmv. 109, 270,367.
35. Gelpcke v. City of Dubuque, 1 Wall. 175 (U. S. 1863) (followed by some 300 other
municipal bond cases), discussed in Jackson, supra note 28, at 612, commenting on the
analyses by Gray and Holmes, supra notes 28, 31, and Rand, Swift v. Tyson rersus Gelp.-e v.
Dubuque (1895) 8 HARV. L. REV. 328. These analyses had urged that this line of decizion
repudiated the Tyson thesis that court decisions constituted not law, but only evidence of
what the law was.
36. (1938) 47 YALE L. J. at 1352, and see also his suggestions in (1941) SO YAmr, L. J.
762, cited supra notes 14, 29.
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vast united achievement as a nation, somewhat belies even this for-
malistic rule. But after all, these problems come down to a choice of
policy; and the Tyson rule came in as a gradual and not unnatural de-
velopment in balancing and adjusting the national against the local
interests of that day and period. Indeed in support of the view that
the Act did not apply to questions of a more general nature than those
of local statutes, as well as rights and titles to real estate, "and .other
matters immovable and intraterritorial in their nature and character,"
Story felt it necessary to say only that "it never has been supposed by
us" to be otherwise, without citing any cases. 7 But earlier cases do
show a gradual development where is stressed the philosophy of comity,
from the rather natural analogy of international law and the dealings
between independent and mutually respected sovereignties.s So we
find even the independent Justice Johnson, whose judicial opinions
are much admired of late, developing the point that, outside of purely
local and statutory matters, the decisions of state courts are to be
treated with the respect that comity suggests, but without the com-
pulsion of binding force. 9 It is interesting that in a fairly late case
Justice Cardozo used the concept of "a benign and prudent comity"
with complete success as a means of avoiding the Tyson doctrine, a
judicial technique which, in the light of all the conflicting pressures
here involved, has much to commend it. 4°
I suggest, therefore, that the Tyson rule developed as a result of
pressures fairly natural under the circumstances. The Court had and
has to do with questions that transcend the artificial limits set by
37. 16 Pet. at 18, 19. Note that Justice Story does not limit the scope of local laws to
statutes alone.
38. Cases are cited in Burgess v. Seligman, 107 U. S. 20, 34, 35 (1883); and see careful
discussion in Teton, loc. cit. supra note 29, and Broh-Kahn, op. cit. supra note 27. Thus,
Johnson, J., said in Ogden v. Saunders, 12 Wheat. 213, 359 (U. S. 1827), with respect to the
effect of a state discharge from debts in another state and in the federal courts: "The ques.
tion is one partly international, partly constitutional." And he held the discharge effective
only in the state where given, and not in the federal courts or in other state courts. Cf.
Shaw v. Robbins, 12 Wheat. 369 n. (U. S. 1827).
39. Compare his statements in Shelby v. Guy, 11 Wheat. 361, 368 (U. S. 1826); Ogden
v. Saunders, 12 Wheat. 213, 359 (U. S. 1827), cited supra note 38; and Fullerton v. Bank
of U. S., 1 Pet. 604, 614 (U. S. 1828), and his concurring opinion in Daly's Lessee v. James,
8 Wheat. 495, 542 (U. S. 1823); and see, generally, Morgan, Mr. Justice William Johnson
and the Constitution (1944) 57 HARv. L. REV. 328; Levin, Mr. Justice William Johnson,
Creative Dissenter (1944) 43 MIcH. L. REv. 497; Levin, Mr. Justice William Johnson and
the Common Incidents of Life (1945) 44 Mica. L. REv. 59, 243.
40. Mutual Life Ins. Co. of New York v. Johnson, 293 U. S. 335, 339 (1934): "Without
suggesting an independent preference either one way or the other, we yield to the judges of
Virginia expounding a Virginia policy and adjudging its effect. The case will not be com-
plicated by a consideration of our power to pursue some other course. The summum jus
of power, whatever it may be, will be subordinated at times to a benign and prudent comity."
See also his decisions in Hawks v. Hpamill, 288 U. S. 52 (1933); and Marine Nat. Exchange
Bank of Milwaukee v. Kalt-Zimmers Mfg. Co., 293 U. S. 357 (1934).
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state boundary lines; even now, after the Tompkins decision, as we
shall see, courts are troubled by what to do with cases involving names
or property or wrongs in many states.41 I do not wish to overemphasize
this history; its importance is now lessened because I suppose hardly
any one expects the Tompkins case to be reversed on its immediate
point. But since I do believe that the Tompkins doctrine will be
canalized and restrained within the boundaries where it is useful and
responsive to the policies which gave it initial authority and continued
sustenance, I think it desirable to keep in mind the forces which led
to the original rule and to note that pressures, somewhat comparable,
although differing as conditions have changed, call for present expres-
sion.42 And there is another matter which is of interest. I suggest that
the original application of the doctrine, coming in somewhat naturally,
did not arouse the objections and doubts of the later cases; it was,
indeed-as Holmes wrote Pollock-the pressing of the doctrine to
extremes which brought forth an aroused and deserved opposition. 43
This later history is of great importance in appraising the rule; I do
not wish to minimize it or slide over it. But it has been well stated
elsewhere,4 4 and I must hurry on. The rule was pressed so far as to
justify the statement of one enthusiastic supporter that "the doctrine
is now well established that in matters of general law such as contracts,
agency, negotiable instruments, insurance, negligence, torts, etc., the
courts of the United States will follow their own decisions and not
those of the several states." 41 One may well see that in the light of
the extensive field listed, the "etc." is ominous. And finally came Blach
& WIhite Taxicab & Transfer Company v. Brouvt &- Yellow Taxicab &
Transfer Company 46 which seems to have been the last straw. There
41. Compare Purcell v. Summers, 145 F. (2d) 979 (C. C. A. 4th, 1944), involving a
church name and property, and other cases, such as those concerning copyright and trade-
marks, discussed later in this paper.
42. Such as the pressures for law protecting the investing public and in other "federal
fields" discussed infra p. 284.
43. "It all comes from Story in Swift v. Tyson. . .. The decision was unjustifiable
in theory but did no great harm when confined to what Story dealt vith, but under the
influence of Bradley, Harlan, et al. it now has assumed the form that upon questions of the
general law the U. S. courts must decide for themselves-of course exprersing a deire to
follow the state courts if they can." Holmes to Pollock-, 1928, 2 HourEs-PoLLoUo LTMtm-s
(1941) 215; LERNER, TuE lxiND um FArmIr OF JusTicE HOLmES (1943) 196; and cf. Teton,
supra note 29, at 538.
44. A good succinct statement is to be found in Air. Justice Jackson's article, supra
note 28. See also his STRUGGLE FOR JUDICML SUFPREM CY (1941) 2;2-283.
45. Parker, The Federal Jurisdiction and Recent Attacks upon It (1932) 18 A. B. A. J.
433, 438. This statement led to the article: Campbell, Is Swift vs. Tyson An Argument for
or against Abolishing Diversity of Citizenship Jurisdiction? (1932) 18 A. B. A. J. 809.
46. 276 U. S. 518 (1928), cited supra notes 11, 31. Among criticisms at the time, note
Frankfurter, Distribution of Judicial Power between United States and State Courts (1928) 13
Coax. L. Q. 499, 524-530; (1928) 38 YALE L. J. 88; and articles cited 304 U. S. at 73, n. 6.
Involved also was the fiction of corporate residence, so ably criticized in McGovney, A
Supreme Court Fiction (1943) 56 I-av. L. Rnv. 853, 1090, 1225.
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a taxicab company was able to avoid a state rule supporting a grant
of exclusive privileges to a rival at a local Kentucky station by the
mere device of dissolution and reincorporation in another state, en-
abling it thus as the citizen of another state to take advantage of
the more favorable federal rule. Such inconsistencies of justice could
not command assent or respect. That a change should come was
probably to be expected; and perhaps it was natural that it should be
of drastic nature.4 But may there not be a lesson in this experience,
that no violent arbitrary rule can be wholly successful in adjusting
sovereign rights in a federal system, and that perhaps a middle or at
least a more gradual way may be more successful in the long run?
JUDICIAL CONDUCT AS UNCONSTITUTIONAL
These last remarks have perhaps particular point as to Justice
Brandeis' statement that overruling of the doctrine was compelled by
the "unconstitutionality of the course" pursued by the courts for
nearly a hundred years.4 That statement did not win the assent of all
the majority justices at the time and seems to have been rather care-
fully avoided by the Court ever since." It has always puzzled com-
mentators, who have been wont to consider the statement as a dictum,
designed to make the overturn of the old doctrine seem more complete
and more emphatic. 0 Dictum it surely seems to be. The opinion
carefully refrains from terming the rules of decision act unconstitu-
tional, and there was clearly no statute wherein Congress directly com-
manded the federal courts to apply the common law. At most it can
be taken only as a declaration that if such an act were to be passed, it
would conflict with the reservation of rights to the states by the Con-
stitution. But that is in the teeth of earlier statements 1 and, it is
submitted, of earlier practice. There has been some suggestion, it is
true, that Congress cannot control the jurisdiction of the federal courts;
but that view is pretty surely discredited both in theory and in prac-
tice.512 It seems clear that Congress may determine the manner and
47. That an opposing trend had already set in is indicated by Mutual Life Ins. Co. of
New York v. Johnson, 293 U. S. 335 (1934), and other cases cited supra note 40; and see
Burns Mortgage Co. v. Fried, 292 U. S. 487 (1934); Willing v. Binenstock, 302 U. S. 272
(1937); Jackson, supra note 28, at 644.
48. See supra p. 273 and further quotations in note 21 supra.
49. Thus see the careful discussion and limitation in the latest case, Guaranty Trust
Co. v. York, 326 U. S. 99,(1945), cited supra notes 16,32.
50. Compare Shulman and others cited supra note 27. Herriott, .hupra note 27, has the
interesting suggestion that the judicial conduct was unconstitutional because it was beyond
limits yet authorized by Congress.
51. As in Wheaton v. Peters, 8 Pet. 591 (U. S. 1834), cited supra notes 24, 34.
52. There is a complete discussion and consideration of a contention that changes In
federal jurisdiction were unconstitutional by a committee of the American Bar Association
in 1932, in McGovney, supra note 46, at 1225 el seq.
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form of adjudication of rights which under the Constitution may be
committed to the federal courts.
Moreover, the other view obviously proves too much. It would
mean, for example, that Congress could not legislate to restrict the
use of injunction in labor cases or ban the so-called "yellow dog con-
tract." 53 It would throw doubt on the federal declaratory judgments
statute as applied in cases where there is no federal question, to say
nothing of numerous of the federal rules of civil procedure. 4 Logically
applied, it would raise doubt as to much of the peculiar value thought
to inhere in federal trials, such as the relation of the judge and jury,
the traditional position of the judge as more than a mere umpire at the
trial, and even the requirement of jury trial itself.S And it would be
vitally restrictive of the development of federal rights as a whole.
There is little likelihood at present of a general statute re-establishing
the common law in the federal courts; there is, however, already
occurring the development or explanation of common-law remedies
such as deceit and fraud based upon-and completing-a general
federal superstructure. A good example is to be found in the expanded
rights of the investor, not specifically stated in, but logically developed
from, the various security regulation acts." One may suggest that the
battle for the validity of national welfare legislation has been fought
and won; it would be, indeed, an anomaly to have it break out again
in this narrow corner. I think we will not be unduly venturesome in
believing that the suggestion has already served its function in aiding
in the initial reversal of "doctrine" and that it will not return to hamper
further development of national rights.17
53. 47 STAT. 70 (1932), 29 U. S. C. §§ 101, 103 (1940); if. also FED. R. Cur. P. 65(e). See
discussion in (1941) 41 COL. L. Rzv. 104, 103-115, pointing out that the statute is framed in
terms of jurisdiction of the federal courts; and cf. Tunks, supra note 27, at 295.
54. Tunks, supra note 27, at 279, 295. Consider, for example, the considerable dis-
cussion as to the validity-against varying state law-of FED. IL Civ. P. 23(b), stating con-
ditions under which a shareholder's derivative action for the corporation against directors
and officers may be brought. Committee Note, SECO'D PRELSMIAnTy Dm='rl or PorosED
A _E.D.IENTS TO RuLEs OF CIVIL PROCEDURE (May, 1945) 24-30; 2 ,MoorE, FEDiPnAL
PRACTICE (Supp. 1945) 85-9; (1941) 41 COL. L. R.Ev. 104, 115-21; 4 FED. RULES SErrV. 909;
6 id. 772. This is only the former Equity Rule 27, established in response to a felt newd in
the case of Hawes v. City of Oakland, 104 U. S. 450 (1882); it, too, could be framed, or
viewed, in terms of federal jurisdiction.
55. The ramifications of this problem are considered infra at p. 289.
56. This, too, is considered infra at p. 284.
57. Note that Holmes, who originally developed the idea of an unconstitutional as-
sumption of powers by the United States courts, perhaps as an expansion of an idea ex-
pressed in Field's dissent in Baltimore & 0. R. Co. v. Baugh, 149 U. S. 363, 391 (1893),
cited supra note 11, of the autonomy of the states as preserved by the Federal Constitu-
tion, would "leave Swift v. Tyson undisturbed," but "would not allow it to spread the
assumed dominion into new fields." Dissent in Black & White Taxicab & Transfer Co. v.
Brown & Yellow Taxicab & Transfer Co., 276 U. S. 518, 535 (1928). And Holmes himrlAf
did not hesitate to apply the "general law" doctrine, not only in the conflicts cases, irfra
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Now I turn to the four type situations which I have chosen not as
all-inclusive, but as offering the most striking illustrations to date of
cases where the simple rubric of the intolerability of competing sys-
tems of law applicable to the same facts is not adequate. Useful and
equitable as that rubric is in many cases, it can be easily pressed to the
point of unreality, indeed of inequity, in complicated affairs of modern
life. It is not my purpose to suggest definitive answers to these prob-
lems, or any general rule for their solution. Rather it is my belief that
each calls for solution in terms of weighing and balancing policy con-
siderations. Some undoubtedly will and can be settled in terms of
local law; but others just as surely call for a solution on a more na-
tional basis, a solution which cannot be foreclosed or denied by any
single pronouncement, however forthright. And first I raise a question
as to
THE IMPACT OF FEDERAL SPECIALTIES ON LOCAL LAW
Merely to state the question of controlling force between local and
federal law within the latter's definite field is, of course, to answer it.
By the Constitution, by settled precedent, and by long-continued
practice, the latter is supreme. But that is but the beginning stage of
our problem. "Render unto Caesar the things which are Caesar's"
does not tell us what things are Caesar's. And while some questions
are easily answered, others become most difficult. Perhaps we may well
start with the separate problem whether the Tompkins rule, and the
revised view of the Rules of Decision Act, governs cases only in the
federal courts by reason of the diverse citizenship of the parties.
Historically, of course, there is much to be said for that view. The
provision for a federal tribunal to hear cases of out-of-state citizens
aroused objection and debate, and the rules of decision act was an at-
tempt to meet those objections to federal courtsY5 And the jurisdic-
tion over federal questions came only many years later.Y9 In all dis-
cussions of the Tompkins doctrine, the Supreme Court has been careful
to limit both its rationale and decision to diversity cases-a limitation
almost pointedly stressed in its latest case decided last June. 0 And
one member of the Court has urged in a concurring opinion that the
note 83, but also in some much criticized tort cases. United Zinc & Chemical Co. v. Britt,
258 U. S. 268 (1922), 36 HARv. L. REv. 113; Baltimore & 0. R. Co. v. Goodman, 275 U. S.
66 (1927), (1930) 43 HARV. L. REV. 926; LERNER, op. cit. supra note 43, at 201, 205. See also
Peck v. Tribune Co., 214 U. S. 185 (1939), where he settled an issue of libel without a single
reference to the local law.
58. Warren, New Light on the History of the Federal Judiciary Act of 1789 (1923) 37
HARV. L. REv. 49; Friendly, The Historic Basis of Diversity Jurisdiction (1928) 41 HARV. L.
REv. 483.
59. Act of Mar. 3, 1875, 18 STAT. 470; cf. FRANKFURTER AND LANDIS, THFE BUSINESS OF
THE SUPREME COURT (1928) 65.
60. Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99 (1945), cited supra notes 16,32.
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rule be thus limited.61 On the face of the record, therefore, there is
good ground for stating the limitation.
But except as a device for avoiding the rigidity and inflexibility of
the doctrine, as now applied, such a limitation has doubtful benefits.
Or to state it another way, if this doctrine does not apply in nondiver-
sity cases, we must obviously fashion one of similar character for such
cases. Consider the ordinary administration of a bankrupt estate.
There, if anywhere, the federal law is supreme under the exclusive
federal jurisdiction in bankruptcy. And yet much of such administra-
tion depends on interpretation of local law, statutory or common,
involving such matters as conditional sales, chattel mortgages, con-
veyances in fraud of creditors, pledges, and so on. Here in New York
we have no tougher cases to decide than those of this nature, though
often the amount involved is almost negligible. And often there is very
little to help us in the New York decisions, for the natural reason that
these questions become important only on the bankruptcy of a debtor,
and there is more occasion for decision in the federal than the state
courts. But these are matters of local property law which even under
the Tyson doctrine were relegated to the state precedents. Some of
these problems arising in natural course may be actually decided in
the state courts. Thus the distinction between summary jurisdiction
and adjudication in bankruptcy as opposed to the necessity of a
plenary suit in the civil courts is a narrow one, turning on such issues
as the possession of the property or even the consent of the parties to
bankruptcy jurisdiction. 2 It can hardly be so that a summary turn-
over order will depend on one approach, while a plenary civil action
by the trustee will turn on another. If, for example, the latter action
should be determined by a single ancient state precedent of a lower
court (as is now asserted),3 it would seem that like principles should
determine the bankruptcy judgment. And that, in fact, is the prac-
tice.64
But in the interweaving of state and federal law, nice questions of
61. Jackson, J., concurring in D'Oench, Duhme & Co. v. Federal Deposit Ins. Corp.,
315 U. S. 447, 465 (1942). Douglas, J., for the Court -aid that the question need not be
decided, for the matter at issue involved decision of a federal question, 315 U. S. at 456. Se2a
Notes (1942) 26 MiNN. L. REv. 899; (1942) 16 TE-P. L. Q. 336; (1942) 28 VA. L. RE%,. 821.
62. Cline v. Kaplan, 323 U. S. 97 (1944), (1945) 54 YALE L. J. 461, (1945) 19 J. N. A.
REF. BANER. 75, 107.
63. Compare (1941) 54 HARV. L. Rlv. 879, criticizing Lockhart v. Garden City Bank &
Trust Co., 116 F. (2d) 658 (C. C. A. 2d, 1940).
64. Compare the case, discussed below, where we awaited the decision of the state
court. Wickes Boiler Co. v. Godfrey-Keeler Co., 116 F. (2d) 842 (C. C. A. 2d, 1940), re'd
121 F. (2d) 415 (C. C. A. 2d, 1941), cert. dedeS Godfrey-Keeler Co. v. Wickes Boiler Co.,
314 U. S. 686 (1941), 50 YALE L. J. 126S. The Supreme Court has even directed the bank-
ruptcy court to seek a state court adjudication. Thompson v. Magnolia Petroleum Co.,
309 U. S. 478 (1940), criticized in (1940) 53 HAnv. L. Rlv. 1394.
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balancing interests must necessarily develop. I recall with somewhat
melancholy interest a situation where we felt bound by a state rule of
interpretation of contractual priorities among creditors in the case of
the guaranteed mortgage bonds, so prominent a feature of recent
New York real estate history. But we were wrong, for the bankruptcy
rule of equality was held to, govern ;65 and the blow was not tempered
for us, and, I suspect, for the interested creditors, upon learning first
by a case coming by way of the state courts," and later by a federal
bankruptcy case,17 that as to most of the bond issues involved, the
state law would ultimately prevail. Such inconsistencies, however, as
I realize, can be easily overstressed; for they point only to the infinite
complexities of our problem and the resulting necessity of unusual
due care and foresight lest the judicial foot stumble.03
Another aspect of this problem appears when theory suggests diver-
sity, but practical experience presses towards uniformity, in situations
such as those of unfair business competition closely connected with
infringement of patents, copyrights, or trademarks. Thus in connec-
tion with trademark litigation, where the question has already directly
arisen, it now seems fairly well settled, notwithstanding some earlier
doubts, that federal law does govern trademark infringement, just as
it does infringement of a patent or copyright. 9 But in a particular
case unfair trade practices are likely to go beyond mere appropriation
of a registered trademark ard include such other wrongs as the misuse
of a company or firm name or the passing off of goods to the misleading
of customers. Should such an integrated course of conduct be of neces-
sity broken up into component parts, some for decision under federal
65. Prudence Realization Corp. v. Geist, 316 U. S. 89 (1942) rev'g 122 F. (2d) S03
(C. C. A. 2d, 1941) (Frank, J., dissenting).
66. Prudence Realization Corp. v. Ferris, 323 U. S. 650 (1945), aff'g 292 N. Y. 210,
54 N. E. (2d) 367 (1944).
67. In re 1934 Realty Corp., 150 F. (2d) 477 (C. C. A. 2d, 1945) (per Frank, J.), cert.
denied Prudence Realization Corp. v. Hurd Committee, 66 Sup. Ct. 43 (U. S. 1945).
68. As in other "federal fields" discussed below, the interweaving of bankruptcy and
state law presents an infinite variety of questions; consider such problems as whether
priorities among creditors under the equitable doctrines of Pepper v. Litton, 308 U. S. 295
(1939), may turn also upon state law, 3 COLLIER, BANxRupTcy (14th Ed. 1941) 1767-8,
or whether an adopted plan of reorganization is to be interpreted according to state law,
Shores v. Heady Realization Co., 133 F. (2d) 738 (C. C. A. 9th, 1943); North American
Car Corp. v. Peerless Weighing & Vending Mach. Corp., 143 F. (2d) 938 (C. C. A. 2d,
1944); Reese v. Beacon Hotel Corp., 149 F. (2d) 610 (C. C. A. 2d, 1945), including the re-
quirement that the manner of selecting directors and officers stated in the plan shall be
"equitable" and "consistent with public policy." Bankruptcy Act, § 216(11), 52 STAT. 895
(1938), 11 U. S. C. § 616(11) (1940). See also Bakers Share Corp. v. London Terrace, Inc.,
130 F. (2d) 157 (C. C. A. 2d, 1942); Brown v. McLanahan, 58 F. Supp. 345 (D. Md. 1944).
69. Dwinell-Wright Co. v. National Fruit Product Co., 140 F. (2d) 618 (C. C. A. 1st,
1944), citing cases; Zlinkoff, Erie v. Tompkins: In Relation to the Law of Trade-Marks and.
Unfair Competition (1942) 42 COL. L. RIv. 955, 974-86.
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precedents uniform throughout the nation, some for decision under
purely local and varying principles? 7 0 Students of the subject have
made persuasive arguments for the single approach, and have mourned
the loss of the expert touch which many experienced federal judges
have developed in this joint field in the past.71 But there is already
strong precedent to the contrary; and one may apprehend that the
trend for the immediate future will be the other way 2
Often, however, the dispute borders on the academic. In the past
the views of state judges in this field have been largely influenced by
important federal decisions which have been often cited. Except for
some slight nuances of emphasis, this law may well be much the same,
whether expounded by state or federal judges; and some difficulties of
70. Of course, where diverse citizenship of the parties is lacking, there is a troublecome
question of jurisdiction involved at the outset of the case; differing from my colleagues, I
have felt that usually the federal court should be held to have jurisdiction under the theory
of the one cause of action of Hum v. Oursler, 289 U. S. 233 (1933), and Armstrong Paint &
Varnish Works v. Nu-Enamel Corp., 305 U. S. 315 (1938). See Musher Foundation v.
Alba Trading Co., 127 F. (2d) 9, 11 (C. C. A. 2d, 1942), cerl. denied 317 U. S. 641 (1942);
Zalknd v. Scheinman, 139 F. (2d) 895, 905 (C. C. A. 2d, 1943), cerl. denied 322 U. S. 738
(1944); (1943) 52 YALE L. J. 922; 1 MOORE, FEDEtaR. PRCrXCn (Supp. 1945) 91-3; 3 id.
141-52; PRErI I.XY DL rT, REvIsiox orFEDERALLJUDICLL CODE (1945) § 1360.
71. Chafee, Unfair Competition (1940) 53 HAnv.. L. Rnv. 1289, 1296-1300; Zlinkoff,
supra note 69, at 966-969, 986-990; Zlinkoff, Monopoly rvrsus Competitibor (1944) 53 YALE
L. J. 514, 542-551.
72. See the scholarly decision of Wyzanski, J., in National Fruit Product Co. v.
Dwinell-Wright Co., 47 F. Supp. 499 (D. Mass. 1942), aff'd on other grounds Dvinell-Wright
Co. v. National Fruit Product Co., 140 F. (2d) 61S (C. C. A. 1st, 1944), cited supra note 69;
Mishawaka Rubber & Woolen Mlfg. Co. v. Panther-Panco Rubber Co., 55 F. Supp. 303,
310 (D. Mass. 1944); Skinner Mfg. Co. v. Kellogg Sales Co., 143 F. (2d) 895, 897 (C. C. A.
8th, 1944), aff'g 52 F. Supp. 432 (D. Neb. 1943), cert. denied 323 U. S. 766 (1944); cf. Dwin-
ell-Wright Co. v. White House Milk Co., 132 F. (2d) 822 (C. C. A. 2d, 1943). But this
view has been criticized in Zlinkoff, Some Reactions to t7e Opinion of Judge Wrzansi in
1National Fruit Product Co. v. Dwindl-Wrighzt Company (1942) 32 TrADE-. trN REP. 131, and
in (1943) 11 Gno. WAsH. L. REv. 255; and Philco Corp. v. Phillips Mfg. Co., 133 F. (2d) 663
(C. C. A. 7th, 1943), held federal law to govern unfair competition in use of a marl: similar
to a registered trademark on goods not of "substantially the same descriptive proparti s"
as required under 33 STAT. 728 (1905), 15 U. S. C. § 96 (1940)--q decision upon vhich 'Mr.
Zlinkoff bases considerable hope for restriction of the Tomphkins doctrine in this field.
Zlinkoff, supra note 71, at 544. It is settled, however, that state law governs where juricdic-
tion rests on diversity alone, Pecheur Lozenge Co. v. National Candy Co., 315 U. S. 666
(1942), rev'g 122 F. (2d) 318 (C. C. A. 3d, 1941), and cases cited Zlinkoff, supra note 71, at
549, n. 104, though, as pointed out, a number of cases have decided the issue on the ba-is
of general law without mentioning the Tompkins case, e.g., RCA Mfg. Co. v. Whiteman,
114 F. (2d) 86 (C. C. A. 2d, 1940), cert. denied 311 U. S. 712 (1940); American Fork: & Hoe
Co. v. Stampit Corp., 125 F. (2d) 472 (C. C. A. 6th, 1942); J. C. Penney Co. v. H. D. Lee
Mercantile Co., 120 F. (2d) 949 (C. C. A. 8th, 1941); Cleo Syrup Corp. v. Coca-Cola Co.,
139 F. (2d) 416 (C. C. A. 8th, 1943), cert. denied 321 U. S. 781 (1944); Brooks Bros. v. Brooks
Clothing of California, 60 F. Supp. 442 (S. D. Cal. 1945), but compare on later motion, 5
F. RL D. 14 (S. D. Cal. 1945). In Remick Music Corp. v. American Tobacco Co., 57 F.
Supp. 475 (S. D. N. Y. 1944), the court followed state law against its olm views. See (1945)
45 COL. L. REv. 473,478; N. Y. L. J., 1262, 1273.
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decision have been avoided upon note of this fact.7" The real difficulty
thus becomes one of seeming avoidance of a primary citation and
reliance upon one of lesser persuasive weight. Perhaps then no perma-
nent harm results beyond a legal opinior more formalistic than usual.
And the remedy for so much of the difficulty is not hard to find. It is
merely that the federal judges be allowed to resume their functions in
exercising the judicial process, as I hope to demonstrate later, and
not be restricted to the r6le of "ventriloquist's dummy" as to state
law, to borrow the apt phrase coined by my colleague Judge Frank.74
There is another line of development away from the Todpkins doc-
trine in the so-called "federal fields," in the shape either of strictly new
or of recently uncovered bodies of federal law. This may be, in fact,
the broadest line of partial return to Story and his colleagues that we
shall discover. Mention has already been made of some such fields, as
the labor law developed in the Norris-La Guardia Act.7" Others of
present importance include those of a national law of government
commercial paper, applicable to instruments of exchange issued by the
United States,7 a revaluation of the law of estoppel in the patent and
anti-trust cases,77 and, quite literally, a flock of diverse matters ranging
from telegraphic libel, through federal taxation, to claims against the
United States under the Tucker Act.78 I have already mentioned the
73. Thus, see Gum, Inc., v. Gumakers of America, 136 F. (2d) 957 (C. C. A. 3d, 1943),
discussed by Zlinkoff, supra note 71, at 550; and note particularly the cases citing only
federal precedents in note 72 supra.
74. In Richardson v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 126 F. (2d) 562, 567 (C. C. A.
2d, 1942).
75. 47 STAT. 70 (1932), 29 U. S. C. § 103 (1940), cited supra note 53. Cf. Steele v.
Louisville & N. R. Co., 323 U. S. 192, 204 (1944); N. L. R. B. v. New Era Die Co., 118 F.
(2d) 500,505 (C. C. A. 3d, 1941).
76. Clearfield Trust Co. v. United States, 318 U. S. 363, 744 (1943), 43 COL. L. REV.
520. See also D'Oench, Duhme & Co. v. Federal Deposit Ins. Corp., 315 U. S. 447 (1942),
cited supra notes 25, 61, and Deitrick v. Greaney, 309 U. S. 190 (1940), 40 COL. L. REv, 712,
35 ILL. L. REv. 218, 88 U. oF PA. L. REv. 876, dealing with federal banking laws; and ef,
American Surety Co. of New York v. First Nat. Bank, 141 F. (2d) 411, 416 (C. C. A. 4th,
1944).
77. Sola Electric Co. v. Jefferson Electric Co., 317 U. S. 173 (1942), (1943) 56 HARV. L.
REv. 814, 12 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 94; Scott Paper Co. v. Marcalus Mfg. Co., 66 Sup. Ct.
101 (U. S. 1945); American Cutting Alloys, Inc. v. General Electric Co., 135 F. (2d) 502
(C. C. A. 2d, 1943); Nachman Spring-Filled Corp. v. Kay Mfg. Co., 139 F. (2d) 781 (C. C.
A. 2d, 1943).
78. O'Brien v. Western Union Telegraph Co., 113 F. (2d) 539 (C. C. A. 1st, 1940)
(libel by telegraph company) (1940) 54 HARV. L. REV. 141; f. Vaigneur v. Western Union
Telegraph Co., 34 F. Supp. 92 (E. D. Tenn. 1940), (1941) 41 CoL. L. REv. 125; Richardson v.
Comm'r of Int. Rev., 126 F. (2d) 562 (C. C. A. 2d, 1942), cited supra note 74 (tax action),
and Lusthaus v. Comm'r of Int. Rev., 149 F. (2d) 232 (C. C. A. 3d, 1945) (taxation of hus-
band and wife as partners; the dissent urged state law); but see Tower v. Comm'r of Int.
Rev., 148 F. (2d) 388 (C. C. A. 6th, 1945), and Grant v. Comm'r of Int. Rev., 150 F. (2d)
915 (C. C. A. 10th, 1945); Girard Trust Co. v. United States, 149 F. (2d) 872 (C. C. A. 3d,
1945) (Tucker Act); cf. (1941) 54 HARv. L. REv. 1070; United States v. Forness, 125 F.
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interesting cases arising in connection with the security regulation acts
for the protection of the investor. Here the Securities and Exchange
Commission is established as the general guardian of the public inter-
est; but intermediate federal courts have held that private rights of
action accrued to individuals damaged through violation of the regu-
latory actions, even without specific definition of such rights in the
statutes.79 The recent important York case arising out of the collapse
of the Van Sweringen railroad empire somewhat suggested this point;
indeed, a commentator suggested affirmance of the lower court decision
refusing to apply state statutes of limitation to a federal remedy in
equity on this ground.l Since, however, the acts complained of oc-
curred long before this new legislation, it is not strange that the major-
ity of the Supreme Court did not refer to the matter, but followed its
principle of equality of treatment of litigants in the same territorial
area to hold the state statutes applicable. The dissenting justices did,
however, suggest this view, and obviously left it open for further ex-
amination later."' There will surely be a further constantly developing
body of federal law for the benefit of the "common man," and the
federal courts can hardly set themselves once again against the trend.
CHoicE OF STATE LAW IN TH FEDERAL CoumRS
When we come to the question of choice of law among that of several
states, it is hardly necessary to tell lawyers at all familiar with the
problems of the conflict of laws that we are about to open a veritable
Pandora's box. We can, of course, proceed from the comparatively
simple case of choice between the law of only two states to most com-
plicated problems involving the law of many states. This question was
not settled by the Tompkins case; indeed, so far as that went, it ap-
peared to apply the law of the situs, Pennsylvania, rather than the
law of the forum, New York.32 Before that case, as Professor Walter
(2d) 928 (C. C. A. 2d, 1942), cerl. denied City of Salamanca v. United States, 316 U. S. 694
(1942) (Indian law). In general, see Eisenhart, Federal Decisional Law Independent of State
Common Law since Erie R. R. Co. v. Tomphins (1941) 9 GEo. Wsu. L. REv. 465; Sibley,
Delimitations of Erie Railroad Co. vs. Tomphins (1941) 29 Ky. L. J. 172; (1943) 43 COL. L.
REV. 520,521.
79. Goldstein v. Groesbeck, 142 F. (2d) 422,427 (C. C. A. 2d, 1944), cert. denied Groa-
beck v. Goldstein, 65 Sup. Ct. 36 (U. S. 1944); Baird v. Franklin, 141 F. (2d) 238, 245 (C. C.
A. 2d, 1944), cert. denied 65 Sup. Ct. 38 (U. S. 1944).
80. (1944) 44 COL. L. REv. 915. In the Supreme Court the Solicitor General filed a
brief on behalf of the Securities and Exchange Commission, as amicus curiae. (1945) 13
U.S. L.NWaE456S.
81. Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U. S. 99 (1945), cited supra notes 16, 32. The
Supreme Court has granted certiorari, 66 Sup. Ct. 176 (U. S. 1945), in Holmberg v. Arm-
brecht, 150 F. (2d) 829 (C. C. A. 2d, 1945), where a state statute of limitations was applied
to a federal equity right.
82. See note 20 supra. There were differing views as to the effect of the Tornp.*ns
decision on the law of conflicts; see citations to law reviews in Cooz, Tan Locc.AL ALND
LEGAL BASES OF =E CoNFLIct OF Lkws (1942) 108.
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Wheeler Cook has shown, the Court had always assumed to apply its
own version of the law in the conflicts situation, and both Justices
Holmes and Brandeis had done so, without ever raising question as
to it.3
But after the Tompkins decision, it was perhaps to be expected that
the law of some one state must be the rule of decision. In the first
important case, the question was whether the federal court in Massa-
chusetts in a suit upon a Maine automobile accident should apply the
rule of burden bf proof of contributory negligence of Maine or that of
Massachusetts. Judge Magruder for the First Circuit Court of Ap-
peals, in a carefully reasoned opinion, which, however, appears not to
have commanded the support of his colleagues, held that the Eric
principle required adoption of the law of the forum,84 That decision
has been explicitly approved and followed in the Supreme Court,
notably in cases dealing with the interest to be awarded on a recovery
upon a contract, and insurable .interest on life insurance policies."5
Whatever the theoretical arguments for the other views, it may be
taken as now settled that the law of the forum must control in the
federal courts in the choice of law among states.
As Professor Cook has shovn, however, this still leaves open many
an important problem. Indeed, Professor Cook's entire monograph on
The Logical and Legal Bases of the Conflict of Laws is a warning against
making judicial decision too simple and thereby glossing over the
difficulties involved in adjudication."8 He makes a persuasive argu-
ment that, amidst the uncertainties not merely of state decisions, but
of the theories upon which conflicts questions are to be resolved,
indeed, the sharp conflict among differing conflicts-theories, the federal
courts would be bringing some order to the law by attempting to
determine at least the more appropriate among the various state-
supported rules. The subject is fascinating, and I wish I need not
hurry over it; but the insurance case will have to serve as illustration
of the kind of problems.87 There it was held that, where the personal
representatives sued in a Texas federal court on a New York policy
83. Cooi:, op. cit. supra note 82, at 113-122. This was a natural approach to the
subject through the Court's initial conception of it as private "international law," Ogden v.
Saunders, 12 Wheat. 213 (U. S. 1827), cited supra note 38.
84. Sampson v. Channell, 110 F. (2d) 754 (C. C. A. 1st, 1940) (Wilson, C. J., concurring
in the result; Peters, D. J., dissenting), cerl. denied Channell v. Sampson, 310 U. S. 650
(1940). This case was extensively discussed in the law reviews, and has been cited approv-
ingly by such cases-in addition to those noted infra note 85-as Palmer v. Hoffman, 318
U. S. 109 (1943), and Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U. S. 99 (1945), cited supra notes 16,
32,49, 60, 81.
85. Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Electric Mfg. Co., 313 U. S. 487 (1941); Griffin v. McCoach,
313 U. S. 498 (1941).
86. CooK, op. cit. supra note 82, at 3-5, 41-47, 154-156, 183-186, 211-214,
87. Griffin v. McCoach, 313 U. S. 498 (1941), cited supra note 85.
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and the company by interpleader brought in assignees of the policy
who had paid the premiums, the contract was controlled by the pe-
culiar and unique Texas policy,s that an assignee or beneficiary with-
out an insurable interest could not collect upon itP That is, had the
assignees started suit first in any other federal court (as in New York,
where the policy and assignments were delivered, or in New Jersey,
where the company's own office was), they must have recovered; but
the chance of the location of suit leads to a windfall to the estate.
This seems to be the very kind of shopping for a favorable tribunal
which the Tompkins rule was designed to discourage. Professor Cook,
in his critique of the case, suggests some interesting further problems,
such as whether the assignees, having paid premiums, can properly
claim to have lost property without due process of law, or, indeed,
whether the assignees are now barred from a more favorable tribunal,
since the decision was based on a Texas public policy closing its courts
to litigants so circumstanced."
The question becomes more involved when the law of several states
is concerned. I will content myself with citing two cases by way of
example and contrast. The first wras one for violation of a claimed
right of privacy and for libel in several states by an article in a maga-
zine published in New York and widely distributed." The second was
an action for a declaratory judgment and injunction concerning the
use of a name and disposition of property of church organizations
active in many states.92 The results, so far as the cases in what are
termed-doubtless with not a little reason-the "inferior" federal
courts are concerned, are that the first is governed by the differing
provisions of state law, while the second went somewhat tentatively
(and with a suggestion of exemption for activities in South Carolina,
the state of the forum) on the law of unfair competition "which we
think is recognized as the law by practically all courts in this country
and England." And cited therefor were three federal cases.03 Thus,
88. Obtaining only in Texas and Quebec. New England Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Spance,
104F. (2d) 665, 668 (C. C.A.2d, 1939).
89. This was the obvious effect of the decision in the Supreme Court; it was made clear
when the court below denied all recovery, Griffin v. McCoach, 123 F. (2d) 550 (C. C. A.
5th, 1941), and the Supreme Court refused review, 316 U. S. 683, 713 (1942). On further
proceedings in the Klaxon case the court found the law of the forum, Delaware, not different
from that of the situs, New York. Stentor Electric Mfg. Co., Inc. v. Klaxon Co., 125 F. (2d)
820 (C. C. A. 3d, 1942), cerl. denied 316 U. S. 685 (1942).
90. Coox, op. cit. supra note 82, at 130-135. See also Morgan, Choice of Law Gcrming
Proof (1944) 58 HAZv. L. REv. 153, 157, 158; Zlinkoff, supra note 69 at 962-966.
91. Sidis v. F-R Pub. Corp., 113 F. (2d) 806 (C. C. A. 2d, 1940), cerl. defe 311 U.S.
711 (1940).
92. Purcell v. Summers, 145 F. (2d) 979, 989 (C. C. A. 4th, 1944).
93. One of these was RCA Mfg. Co. v. Whiteman, 114 F. (2d) 86 (C. C. A. 2d, 1940),
cert. denied 311 U. S. 712 (1940), cited supra note 72, which relied on general law.
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there was applied-to an end practically desirable, however difficult
the rationale-the technique I referred to earlier as followed in the
case of unfair competition, which might be developed for general use,
if a broader basis of decision of existing state law is restored to federal
judges.9 4
SUBSTANCE VS. PROCEDURE
The dichotomy of substance and procedure has had more discussion
than any other single feature of the Tompkins doctrine. This was
natural in view of the general importance of the subject; but it was
made more dramatic by reason of the fact that four months earlier the
Supreme Court had adopted rules of civil procedure, effective only
several months later, designed to make uniform the procedure in all
the federal courts throughout the country. Thus at the time the
Court was substituting uniformity for state conformity in procedure,
it was requiring state conformity in substantive matters. Since the
matter has been so often discussed,95 I shall limit myself to stating the
conclusions already judicially reached. The most definite to date is
that the burden of proof of contributory negligence is a matter of sub-
stance which must follow state law, while the burden of pleading that
issue may follow the uniform federal rule as announced." But also,
along with the holding that state statutes of limitation must govern
even equity actions, is the definite admonition that not too much
stress should be put upon these labels "as though they defined a great
divide cutting across the whole domain of law," that, indeed, "such
abstractions" should be put aside for "the nub of the policy," that
the accident of citizenship "should not lead to a substantially different
result." 11 We may take it, therefore, as assured that the Court is at-
tempting to view the rules sensibly and practically in the light of this
policy and that it will not overthrow most of the rules or even perhaps
an unusual number, as has been suggested by some commentators 03
to press for an unreal enforcement of its ideal.9 This is, I think, as
might be expected under the present climate of opinion; and though
94. Developed supra p. 282, also infra p. 294.
95. Various articles and notes are collected in 1 FED. RULES SERv. 860-867, and see
bibliography in current issues. Compare my articles: Procedural Aspects of the New State
Independence (1940) 8 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 1230; and The Tompkins Case and the Federal
Rules (1941) 24 J. Am. JuD. Soc. 158, 1 F. R. D. 417.
96. Palmer v. Hoffman, 318 U. S. 109 (1943), and Sampson v. Channell, 110 F. (2d)
754 (C. C. A. 1st, 1940), both cited supra note 84.
97. Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U. S. 99, 108, 109 (1945). For the "accident of
citizenship," see L. Hand, J., in Weiss v. Routh, 149 F. (2d) 193, 195 (C. C. A. 2d, 1945).
98. Compare Tunks, supra note 27, at 279, 283; (1939) 27 GEo. L. J. 375, 376; cf.
(1941) 41 COL. L. REv. 1403, 1416.
99. Compare Clark, The Tompkins Case and the Federal Rules (1941) 24 J. A .JUD. SoC.
158, 1 F. R. D. 417, arguing for prima facie validity to the rules; 1 MOORE, FEDERAL PRAC-
TICE (Supp. 1945) 24-26.
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there will remain a certain amount of uncertainty as to particular rules
until the Supreme Court has spoken as to each, there will certainly be
no more uncertainty in this branch of the subject than in others, per-
haps not as much."' Here, too, the variety of problems is fascinating.
For example, I see a case coming over the horizon in my state where the
Court has nullified a legislative policy through vigorous application
of the procedural doctrine of "invited error." After a serious case in
1930 which failed because the victim was killed and plaintiff had no
other eyewitness, the Connecticut legislature gave such a plaintiff the
benefit of a presumption of due care, with the burden of proof of con-
tributory negligence upon the defendant; but the local cases say that
a plaintiff who pleads due care (as in the old forms) forfeits all benefit
of the statute. 'What should prevail in these procedural matters (as
the state courts hold them)-the legislative policy or the important
judicial gloss thereon? Ill
Now let us turn to the impact of state law on federal jury trials.
Here we come up against a provision of the Constitution itself-the
Seventh Amendment, preserving the right of trial by jury in suits at
common law where the value in controversy is more than twenty dollars
and containing the added provision that "no fact tried by a jury, shall
be otherwise re-examined in any Court of the United States, than ac-
cording to the rules of the common law." But if burden of proof and
presumptions are to be governed by state law in diversity cases,10 2
then it rather logically follows that rules as to the direction of a verdict,
taking a case from the jury, and even the so carefully cherished right
of "comment" on the evidence may be either lost or greatly limited
100. See discussion of FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b), supra note 54. FED. IL Civ. P. 4(0, dealing
with the territorial limits of service, is now before the Court. Mississippi Pub. Corp. v. Mur-
phree, 66 Sup. Ct. 44 (U. S. 1945), granting cert. in Murphree v. Mississippi Pub. Corp., 149
F. (2d) 138 (C. C. A. 5th, 1945). [The Murphree case was affirmed, and Rule 4(f) upheld,
by the unanimous court, per STONE, C. J., Jan. 2,1946.]
101. Balchunas v. Palmer, C. C. A. 2d, Nov. 5, 1945, states the problem in construing
CouN. GEN. STAT. (Supp. 1939) § 1399e (as amended in 1939), passed in 1931 as a result of
Kotler v. Lalley, 112 Conn. 86, 151 AtI. 433 (1930) (Wheeler, C. J., dissenting); and cf.
Colligan v. Reilly, 129 Conn. 26, 26 A. (2d) 231 (1942); Hatch v. Merigold, 119 Conn. 339,
176 AtI. 266 (1935), with discussion in (1935) 9 CoNN. Bai J. 282, 290 (1942) 16 id. 83, 92
(1940) 8 GEO. WAsr. L. REV. 1230. Though the statute is held to be procedural, Toletti v.
Bidizcki, 118 Conn. 531, 537, 173 AtI. 223 (1934), the York case, 65 Sup. Ct. 1464 (U. S.
1945), cited supra note 97, warns that such holding is immaterial on the present issue.
102. See cases supra note 96. In New York Life Ins. Co. v. Gamer, 303 U. S. 161 (1933),
just before the Tompkins decision, the Court, Black J., dissenting, reverFed for the applica.
tion of federal law to burden of proof and presumptions; the decision provol:ed criticism in
the law reviews, as not giiing due weight to a Montana statute. But on new trial the
statute was followed, with a verdict for plaintiff, aff'd 106 F. (2d) 375 (C. C. A. 9th, 1939)
(Wilbur, J., dissenting), cert. denied 303 U. S. 621 (1939), which appears to reprezent the
present law. (1941) 9 U. OF Cm. L. REv. 113, 123; (1940) 25 Iowvii L. REv. 375; (1940)
17 N.Y. U.L. Q. Rtv. 466.
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by such law. Though there are cases to the contrary, 103 Professor
Morgan, in a recent acute article already cited with favor by the Su-
preme Court, has suggested with considerable force the application
of state rules as to the discovery of a "jury question," that is, as to
direction of a verdict or non-suit. 1 4 His final suggestion is the practi-
cal one that both the notion and the expression that matters of pro-
cedure are governed by the law of the forum be abandoned for a rule
which should hold the law of the locus applicable "to all such matters
of procedure as are likely to have a material influence upon the out-
come of litigation except where (a) its application will violate the
public policy of the forum or (b) weighty practical considerations
demand the application of the law of the forum." 105 1 suspect he is
probably correct in prophecy; but I wonder how his thesis would
apply to the problem of grant of jury trial itself. For there has already
developed some division of view as to whether the right to claim trial
by jury is governed by state law or by federal principles in the diver-
sity cases.'
How Is STATE LAW To BE ASCERTAINED?
I come now to the last of my type situations, that where the state
law is confused or nonexistent. And this, I say without hesitation, is
the most troublesome, the most unsatisfying in its consequence, of all
the rules based upon the Tompkins case. The other situations require
nice choices of the kind judges must make; we may regret for the sake
of the litigants that the law is not more settled, but we can face de-
cision as an intellectual issue of importance if we may exercise our
judicial faculties. But the current view, rippling down through the
lower federal courts from Supreme Court precedents which perhaps
were not intended to go quite so far, is that we must act as a hollow
sounding board, wooden indeed, for any state judge who cares to ex-
103. Gorham v. Mutual Ben. Health & Accident Ass'n of Omaha, 114 F. (2d) 97, 99
(C. C. A. 4th, 1940), cert. denied 312 U. S. 688 (1941); McSweeney v. Prudential Ins. Co. of
America, 128 F. (2d) 660 (C. C. A. 4th, 1942), cert. denied 317 U. S. 658 (1942); Zauderer v.
Continental Cas. Co., 140 F. (2d) 211 (C. C. A. 2d, 1944); Barr v. Equitable Life Assur. Soc.
of United States, 149 F. (2d) 634 (C. C. A. 9th, 1945); cf. Grobelny v. W. T. Cowan, Inc.,
C. C. A. 2d, Nov. 27, 1945. This, of course, was the former view. Herron v. Southern Pac.
Co., 283 U. S. 91 (1931). But cf. Goodall Co. v. Sartin, 141 F. (2d) 427 (C. C. A. 6th, 1944),
cerl. denied 65 Sup. Ct. 34 (U. S. 1944); and cases infra note 104.
104. Morgan, Choice of Law Governing Proof (1944) 58 HARV. L. Rav. 153, 175, cited In
Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U. S. 99, 110 (1945). Professor Morgan cites for this:
Stoner v. New York Life Ins. Co., 311 U. S. 464 (1940); Laxton v. Hatzel & Buehler, Inc.,
142 F. (2d) 913 (C. C. A. 6th, 1944); Waldron v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 141 F. (2d)
230 (C. C. A. 3d, 1944). See also 3 MooRE, FEDERAL PRACrxcE (Supp. 1945) 3-23.
105. (1944) 58 HARV. L. REV., 195.
106. See extensive discussion and citation of cases by Goodrich, J., in Ettelson v. Metro
politan Life Ins. Co., 137 F. (2d) 62 (C. C. A. 3d, 1943), cert. denied Metropolitan Life Ins.
Co. v. Ettelson, 320 U. S. 777 (1943) (supporting the federal rule); also 3 MoORE, FEDERAL
PRACTICE (Supp. 1945) 14-21; Note (1940) 88 U. of PA. L. REv. 1015.
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press himself. When the Tompkins case was first decided, my colleague
Professor Corbin wrote an article to the effect that, except for the
specific point decided, the Tompkins decision should not be and prob-
ably would not be far-reaching, and that in their search for state law
the federal judges could do little else than they were now doing in
their search for law. They would still read and evaluate the cases and
statutes according to their best learning, rather than by some set
formula. This point of view he has again urged more lately, in criti-
cism of some decisions stating a more arbitrary principle. As he points
out, in cases where the parties are citizens of different states Congress
has made the federal courts a part of the state system of tribunals,
coequal and co-ordinate therewith; and anything short of full judicial
action on the part of the federal judges is a deprivation of the rights
of the litigants to due process and a fair trial."7 That, I believe, is the
best advice and exposition of the doctrine possible. And our attempted
departures from that conduct are what have made the Tompkins result
seem at times bizarre and strange.
Rationally considered, what essential difference is there in our task
in discovering the will of Congress in newly enacted statutes or the
will of the Supreme Court as to changing judicial principles and in
our task in discovering state law, either statutory or common? We
deal with the same types of material or basic data; in each case our
duty is to ascertain the jural views of another body, not to glorify our
own; in each we have to fill in the gaps where a definite showing of
intent is lacking in order to make a consistent and operable whole;
and in each case we are subject to being set right if we err, first by the
Supreme Court, and second by the law reviews and the "court of
public opinion." Why should we abdicate our judicial functions and
even prostitute our intellectual capacities to discover not state law,
but the particular views a state judge may have uttered many years
ago under quite different circumstances? 113 If we do this we are de-
priving litigants of our best judicial and scholarly effort; in fact we
are offering a premium for litigants to jockey to get away from us and
before judges who need not keep their capabilities atrophied. Of course
we are doing no such thing in the vast majority of cases. We are
deciding what state law is in the traditional way of judges in finding
the law."' But every so often, under the stimulus of the TonzpHins
107. See the articles by Professor Corbin cited supra note 14, also other articles there
cited. The idea of the federal court as being for the time being a state tribunal is exprezzsd
in Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U. S. 99, 111-2 (1945).
108. See note 63 supra. As pointed out by Broh-Kahn, Unformilty Rim Rio -F.xensiors
of the Erie Case (1943) 31 Ky. L. J. 99, this may mean accepting an authority which the
state court vil not, as in Ohio, or, it might be added, New York. Conversely the state courts
hold themselves bound only by decisions of the Supreme Court. People ex re. Ray v.
Martin, 294 N. Y. 61, 73, 60 N. E. (2d) 541, 547 (1945).
109. As, indeed, was actually done in the federal courts before the Tomphins decision,
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goad, we suddenly turn to a rigid wooden decision on the theory that
it is required of us by law.
To cite examples may be dangerously to invite invidious compari-
sons. And yet I believe the matter of such importance as to require
the risk. The very case wherein the Supreme Court reinforced the
view that lower state court decisions must be accepted as state law
in the absence of higher precedents," 0 in its ultimate outcome cer-
tainly suggests the problem. There it appeared that New Jersey by
statute had accepted the New York juristic novelty or oddity of the
Totten or "tentative trust," a trust (in bank deposits) which could
remain wholly tentative so far as the beneficiary was concerned until
the settlor's death; but two vice-chancellors had more respect for the
law than to believe it could be made imperfect by a mere legislature,
and so they had construed the statute away by decision. With this
background the Third Circuit Court of Appeals, spealdng through
Judge Biddle, thought and held that the statute still stood, since the
highest court of the state had not spoken-and was promptly reversed
by the Supreme Court for failing to follow state law. Thereafter an-
other vice-chancellor in New Jersey, called upon to interpret the
statute, did so in the light of its obvious intent, and cited Judge Biddle's
opinion-reversed "on another point," as he said, not without irony
-to support his departure from the prior decisions."' And his opinion
seems to be accepted as the New Jersey law not only in New Jersey,
but also in New York.112
There are other cases where, I suggest, formalism, rather than the
true essence of interpretation, is now given scope; and this trend now
goes so far as to reach the construction of state statutes and other
written evidences of the law. Quite naturally I recall best those cases
where, over my protest, my colleagues felt themselves bound by what
seemed to me an overstrict view of the local law or of only an inter-
locutory pleading ruling not intended as a final adjudication.' As
for the great majority of cases presenting the problems were decided by state law. See
22 FED. DIG. § 359 el seg.; Corbin, The Common Law of the United States (1938) 47 YALE
L. J. 1351:
110. Fidelity Union Trust Co. v. Field, 311 U. S. 169 (1940), rev'g Field v. Fidelity
Union Trust Co., 108 F. (2d) 521 (C. C. A. 3d, 1939).
111. Hickey v. Kahl, 129 N. J. Eq. 233, 19 A. (2d) 33 (1941). Such trusts have been
supported. Gulliver and Tilson, Classification of Gratuitous Transfers (1941) 51 YALE L. J.
1, 38; see ScoTT oN TRUSTS (1939) §§ 58-58.6; id. (1944 Supp.) 43.
112. It was cited approvingly in Lester v. Guenther, 132 N. J. Eq. 496, 28A. (2d) 777
(1942), and Franklin Washington Trust Co. v. Beltram, 133 N. J. Eq. 11, 29 A. (2d) 854
(1943), as well as in In re Weinstein's Estate, 176 Misc. 592, 28 N. Y. S. (2d) 137 (Surr. Ct.,
1941), which also cites Judge Biddle's opinion.
113. Smith v. Town of Orangetown, 150 F. (2d) 782 (C. C. A. 2d, 1945), ecri. denied
(1945) 14 U. S. LAW WEE 3180; Droste v. Harry Atlas Sons, 145 F. (2d) 899 (C. C. A. 2d,
1944), 147 F. (2d) 675 (C. C. A. 2d, 1945). That lower state courts do not feel themselves
thus bound, see cases cited 147 F. (2d) at 677, and High v. Pritzker (Sup. Ct., N. Y. 1945),
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to these I have to face the disagreeable possibility that I might be
wrong; but even so, I think all of us agree in regretting the compulsion
which seems to force us to such a course. These, and other instances,
where the federal court feels it cannot really re-examine state law
beyond the wooden limits set by a single precedent, lead, I submit, in
reality to a falsification of the state law by erecting a single instance
into a general principle to the point where, in all likelihood, the state
court eventually would refuse to go.
Then there is the case where there are literally no state precedents
to guide-a situation which we often find in trying to determine the
incidence of New York law affecting creditors in the settlement of
bankrupt estates. As I have suggested, such a situation is not strange,
since the testing of debtor-creditor relations is more usual for the
bankruptcy than the ordinar34state court. In one such case involving
the existence of a trust or lien on assets of an estate we were informed
that a test case was actually coming before the Court of Appeals, and
consented to delay a rehearing of our decision already rendered until
the state court had settled the law. So for a court term -we awaited
the decision of the august state tribunal, which was duly informed, as
we were told, that we were waiting. And when that ruling eventually
came, I cannot believe that there was not a little malice in it; for the
case was dismissed on a procedural point, the court saying that a
definitive ruling must await proper presentation of the issue. But at
least that freed us from the bondage of the ruling below, and we decided
the case as we thought judges should when acting judicially.114 As a
distinguished New York lawyer put it, "You had to dangle your own
parsnip before your nose."
This experience casts some light on a tendency occasionally shovM,
though perhaps more often repudiated, of ordering a federal ruling
deferred until the state courts have spoken. 1 5 Such directive has even
taken the form of a mandate that decision should be held until an
action for a declaratory ruling has been undertaken and concluded in
the state court."6 With deference I suggest that this is neither a
desirable nor a practical solution. XWhen the parties have submitted
114 N. Y. L. J. 1021. See also Leithauser v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 149 F. (2d) 152 (C. C. A.
6th, 1945).
114. Wickes Boiler Co. v. Godfrey-Keeler Co., 116 F. (2d) 842 (C. C. A. 2d, 1940),
rev'd 121 F. (2d) 415 (C. C. A. 2d, 1941), cited supra note 64. See also Cooper v. American
Airlines, 149 F. (2d) 355 (C. C. A. 2d, 1945).
115. Meredith v. City of Winter Haven, 320 U. S. 228 (1943), stated the duty of the
federal court to decide questions of state law in the diversity cases. Cases where state adjudi-
cations have been sought or required include Thompson v. Magnolia Petroleum Co., 309
U. S. 478 (1940), cited supra note 64, and Burford v. Sun Oil Co., 319 U. S. 315 (1943). See
critical comments in (1943) 56 H.v. L. REv. 1162; (1944) 53 YALE L. J. 783; [1944]
Wis. L. REv. 163.
116. Spector Motor Service, Inc. v. McLaughlin, 323 U.S. 101 (1944).
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their righ'ts to a tribunal of competent jurisdiction and have carried
the case on appeal, it is somewhat cold comfort to be told that they
must undertake three to five years' more litigation in the hope of then
getting a more nearly perfect ruling. That such a course of justice
delayed will operate to allay friction betveen state and federal agencies
I submit is hardly a realistic view of our political system; there are too
many points of dispute to make a single, case loom so large in the
over-all picture. Justice delayed is justice denied; on close issues with
arguable positions on either side a reasoned opinion now is more to be
desired by the litigants than a possibly better one in the remote future.
And the chances of jockeying for place, the heart of the Tompkins
doctrine, are measurably increased. I understand there are already
cases where a losing litigant starts a state action before final termina-
tion of his federal action for the very purpose of repairing his defeat
and where the accidental possibility of double litigation operates to
give a despairing attorney a chance to fend off the impending doom.
The very uncertainty in the present federal law on this procedure
makes for further chance-taking or chance-making in litigation.
But there is a still further practical objection which has apparently
not been explored fully. If the rule of thus deferring decision is to be
applied uniformly, it must be applied in a very much greater number
of cases, so much so that certain forms of federal administration,
notably bankruptcy, must literally break down.117 I doubt if the
number of cases in bankruptcy calling for state adjudication has been
considered. A survey of some recent volumes of the Federal Reporter
shows that New York statutes are regularly involved in 15 to 20 per
cent of our cases; if we were to exclude criminal appeals and admiralty
and tax cases, or if we were to confine our count to bankruptcy cases
alone, it would thus run very high. And should we force a descent of
lawyers on state courts for declaratory rulings, I imagine we can already
see a wicked gleam in the eyes of our state colleagues as they contem-
plate measures to avoid the flood.
On this, therefore, the presently most restrictive feature of the
Tompkins doctrine, I cannot believe the solution is difficult or beyond
the scope of existing decisions of the high court properly applied.
Only recently the Supreme Court said that in the absence of guidance
from state tribunals it would leave undisturbed "the interpretation
placed upon purely local law by a Michigan federal judge of long
experience and by three circuit judges whose circuit includes Michi-
gan." 118 That, I submit, points to a release of federal judges back to
judging. Other cases, too, show the trend; witness such cases as those
117. While this seems so far to have been almost exclusively a device for the Supreme
Court, yet it must be resorted to by intermediate and trial courts if that is the system di-
rected by the highest court.
118. MacGregor v. State Mutual Life Assurance Co., 315 U. S. 280, 281 (1942).
[Vol. 55: 267
STATE LAW IN THE FEDERAL COURTS
where the state decision is based upon misconceived or now outmoded
federal law," 9 or where a common-law concept is taken over into fed-
eral law, as negligence under the Federal Employers' Liability Act.'0
Hence my plea is for freedom for the federal judicial process to be
judicial.
THE JuicAL PRocEss A-D NATIONAL LAW
In a memorial lecture to Justice Cardozo, it is fitting that at length
I should return to the fascinating subject of the operation of the judi-
cial process. Just as it has been usual to consider the judicial qualities
of Story in the past, I think it is proper to indulge in a like word or two
about his great modem compeers. Lest this would seem indiscreet, I
add at once that their fame is too secure for any words of those of us
who come after to dim it in the slightest; and moreover, discussion of
such historic figures is now the best way in which we can do them
honor. In particular, Justice Brandeis is one of my own judicial idols,
as, indeed, he has been generally of those brought up in the atmos-
phere of the law schools.' 2' His great qualities were those of the advo-
cate in the highest and best sense; they were shown in those powerful
and documented dissents, which eventually became the law, con-
cemed with the judicial attitude towards welfare legislation. It is
possible that a long period of minority decisions may have made him
not fully cognizant of his own power, so that he failed to realize that
an ancient doctrine, already tending towards decay and death, did not
need the sledge-hammer blows he employed for its destruction. Rumor
has it that the Tompkins case was originally intended for Cardozo
and would have gone to him except for his illness. Perhaps this has no
more basis than the fitness of having the justice who already had
several times found means of employing state law 122 now consolidate
his gains, so to speak, by a yet more specific holding. At any rate,
along with Justice Jackson in his last year's memorial lecture, 23 we
119. Breisch v. Central R. R. of New Jersey, 312 U. S. 4S4 (1941); State Tax Commis-
sion of Utah v. Aldrich, 316 U. S. 174 (1942). See discussion of recent cases in 1 Aloormn,
FEDERAL PRACTICE (Supp. 1945) 51-83. Elsewhere the Court has referred to the importance
of the expression of views by lower federal judges "who are familiar with the intricacies and
trends of local law and practice." Huddleston v. Dwyer, 322 U. S. 232, 237 (1944); see also
City of Texarkana v. Arkansas Louisiana Gas Co., 306 U. S. 18, 198 (1939).
120. Willis v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 122 F. (2d) 248 (C. C. A. 2d, 1941), cert. denied 314
U. S. 684 (1941); Jacobs v. Reading Co., 130 F. (2d) 612 (C. C. A. 3d, 1942); 3 Moo=r,
FEDERAL PRACTcaI (Supp. 1945) 23.
121. Thus see the law review essays on his seventy-fifth birthday, reprinted in the
volume MR. JusTIcE BR.NDEIs, edited by Prof. Felix Frankfurter and published by Yale U.
Press, 1932; also (1931) 41 YALE L. J. 1 etseg.; (1941) 51 id. 85.
122. In the cases cited supra note 40.
123. As Justice Jackson said, referring to the Tompkins case: "Mr. Justice Cardozo
was ill and did not participate in this decision. I have no reason to doubt that he vas
sympathetic with the desire to overcome the evils of the Swift v. Tyson doctrine. The
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can speculate how the gentler touch of Cardozo might have left this
doctrine, and venture the suggestion that perhaps at times the judicial
process may prove too powerful an engine for the material upon which
it has to work.
And my final thought is as to the future of national law. For after
all, we are one country and a united country; and our law must and
will develop to fit our national needs. True, we are a union of states;
and it is proper and fitting that we give scope to state law upon matters
of local interest and value which do not conflict with national needs or
ideals. But when such conflict occurs, no judicial generality or abstrac-
tion will, or should, reject the national demand, whether it be for laws
protecting the investor, setting fair standards for employment, adjust-
ing labor relations, or what not. And this particular segment of the
entire field should not set a different trend; it should be analyzed with
these broader concepts as a definite part of the total picture.
When I chose my topic and began this paper, we were still at war
with both our great enemies. Since then much has occurred of terrific
impact on the history of the world and the future of civilization. I do
not wish to link my poor efforts here to the great menace of the atomic
bomb, though I might have some strong precedents for so doing. 124
But I do think that terrible weapon has brought a sense of the nearness
of all parts of the world to all other parts, and a conviction of the great
need of unity among mankind. Perhaps there is not much we as prac-
ticing lawyers and judges can do to satisfy that need other than to
hope for its fulfillment and support our political leaders in the steps
they take towards it. But at least in our business of the law we can
remember that our forefathers planned "a more perfect union," not a
proving ground for the conflicts of laws, and that that union after
many a travail has achieved a power and a unity, and in consequence
a purpose and force, unequalled in history. And we should ask our-
selves whether its jurisprudence should lag behind.
opinion, however, seems to assume that the process of judging state law by a federal court
can be so mechanical that without the use of judgment of its own it can pick out and apply
state precedents which determine the law of the state. If I read Judge Cardozo aright, le
had no thought that the process of finding decisional law could be so simplified. See, for
example, CARDOZO, TuE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS (1921) 64 el seg." JAczsoN,
FULL F.AITH AND CREDIT (1945) 1, n. 2.
124. See "The Three Modern Wonders-Radar, Atomic Force, and Words & Phrases,"
depicted on the back cover of the West Publishing Co.'s Reporter pamphlets for the first
week of Nov. 1945.
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